Grey parrot numerical competence

By Irene M. Pepperberg, 2006

Annotated on Fermat's Library with 10 comments. Text and annotations as Markdown Original paper

The African gray parrot (Psittacus erithacus) is a species of parro...
There have been a number of recent studies relevant to this. In 200...
There is evidence that nonhuman primates process a number of numeri...
In the cited paper looks at a patient with brain injuries that demo...
**Subitizing** is the ability to reliably state the cardinality of ...
**The Model/Rival method** is a training procedure that Dr. Pepper...
Here is a [video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BG-0Bpe0J34) of G...
Examples of distractors used by Trick and Pylyshyn to distinguish s...
For instance, the ancient Greeks had no symbol for zero, and did no...
Alex provided the first evidence of animals other than primates sho...
Anim Cogn (2006) 9:377–391
DOI 10.1007/s10071-006-0034-7
REVIEW
Grey parrot numerical competence: a review
Irene M. Pepperberg
Received: 30 June 2005 / Revised: 23 June 2006 / Accepted: 27 June 2006 / Published online: 15 August 2006
C
Springer-Verlag 2006
Abstract The extent to which humans and nonhumans
share numerical competency is a matter of debate. Some
researchers argue that nonhumans, lacking human language,
possess only a simple understanding of small quantities,
generally less than four. Animals that have, however,
received some training in human communication systems
might demonstrate abilities intermediate between those of
untrained nonhumans and humans. Here I review data for
a Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus) that has been shown to
quantify sets of up to and including six items (including
heterogeneous subsets) using vocal English labels, to
comprehend these labels fully, and to have a zero-like
concept. Recent research demonstrates that he can also sum
small quantities. His success shows that he understands
number symbols as abstract representations of real-world
collections, and that his sense of number compares favorably
to that of chimpanzees and young human children.
Keywords Parrot
.
Numerical ability
.
Cognition
Introduction
Studies of the development of nonhuman numerical compe-
tence are replete with controversy. Even for humans, some
This contribution is part of the special issue “Animal Logics”
(Watanabe and Huber 2006).
I. M. Pepperberg
Department of Psychology, Brandeis University,
Waltham, MA 02454, USA
I. M. Pepperberg (
)
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, William James
Hall, Vision Science Center,
33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
e-mail: impepper@media.mit.edu
researchers still disagree on what constitutes various stages
of numerical competence (e.g. Gelman and Gallistel 1986;
Davis and P
´
erusse 1988; Gallistel 1988; Fuson 1988;re-
view in Mix et al. 2002), which are the most complex, ad-
vanced stages (e.g. Gallistel 1988; Fuson 1988; Starkey and
Cooper 1995; see Benoit et al. 2004), what mechanisms are
involved (see Benoit et al. 2004) and even what is enumer-
ated (e.g. Clearfield 2004; Feigenson 2005). Controversy
also surrounds the role of language in numerical compe-
tence, not only for preverbal children but also for animal
studies (note Watanabe and Huber 2006). Some scientists
argue (e.g. Lenneberg 1971) that language and number skills
require the same cognitive capacities and that animals, lack-
ing human language, cannot succeed on number tasks; others
view the issue differently and suggest that humans and an-
imals have similar simple, basic number capacities but that
only humans’ language skills enable development of numer-
ical representation and thus abilities such as verbal counting,
addition, etc. (e.g. Carey 2004; Feigenson et al. 2004; Spelke
and Tsivkin 2001). Of course, label acquisition may direct
children (and by implication, label-trained nonhumans) to
attend more closely to characteristics involved in set forma-
tion (e.g. Waxman and Markow 1995; review in Mix et al.
2002), and thus provides preparation for dealing with number
sets.
Scientists still do not even know whether number abilities
require specific human brain centers. In some brain-damaged
humans, numerical abilities may be impaired when other
cognitive abilities are not harmed, but number capacities
can be spared when skills involving memory, language, and
reasoning are all damaged (Butterworth 1995). Other data do
not support the need for a single brain area devoted to storing
numerical knowledge (see Dehaene and Cohen 1994). More
recent studies seem to demonstrate that certain human brain
areas (e.g. intraparietal sulcus) are crucial for number work,
Springer
378 Anim Cogn (2006) 9:377–391
but these areas have also been implicated in global tasks
necessary for nonhuman survival, such as spatial attention;
analogous (if not homologous) areas would thus be expected
in animals (see Pepperberg 2006a). Other studies on possible
parallels in brain areas underlying numerical judgments in
humans and monkeys (review in G
¨
obel and Rushworth 2004;
see also Dehaene et al. 2003, 2004; Nieder and Miller 2003)
support an evolutionary continuum in numerical abilities, but
such data do not help for nonprimate subjects.
Despite controversies, comparisons of animal–human nu-
merical competence continue. Researchers agree that, for
any organism, “number sense” requires handling abstract
concepts–representations and relations (Lenneberg 1971;
Dehaene et al. 1999). A subject must have a representation
of quantity that transfers across modalities and applies to
any items (Seibt 1982). Number sense is not necessarily the
same as true symbolic “counting” (Fuson 1988; Gelman and
Gallistel 1986), which requires subjects to (1) produce a stan-
dard sequence of number tags, (2) apply a unique number tag
to each item to be counted, (3) remember what already has
been counted, and (4) know that the last number tag tells how
many objects are there. Both humans and animals may use
other mechanisms to quantify collections, such as subitizing
or estimating; subitizing being defined (e.g. Kaufman et al.
1949) as a fast, effortless, accurate perceptual apprehension
of number usually ≤4 that uses preattentive mechanisms and
generally involves linear or canonical patterns (think dice or
dominoes); estimation being a perceptual apprehension of
larger numbers influenced by density and regularity of ob-
ject distribution that enables approximations (e.g. between
“80 and 100”; Dehaene 1997, pp. 70–72). Other researchers
describe different noncounting mechanisms (e.g. object files
or accumulators) to explain how very young children and
animals achieve precise numeration for quantities<4 and ap-
proximate values for quantities ≥4(Carey2004; Mix et al.
2002;Xu2003).
Whatever the mechanism used, animals exhibit various
numerical abilities. Chimpanzees have enumeration skills,
though not capacities identical to that of educated humans
(Beran 2001, 2004; Beran and Rumbaugh 2001); monkeys,
pigeons, and rats seem sensitive to ordinality and numerosity
(e.g. Brannon and Terrace 1998, 2000; Brannon et al. 2001;
Emmerton et al. 1997; Jordan and Brannon 2006; Nieder
et al. 2002; Olthof et al. 1997; Orlov et al. 2002; Smith et al.
2003; Sulkowski and Hauser 2001; Xia et al. 2000, 2001;but
see Dehaene
2001); crows (Smirnova et al. 2000; Thompson
1968), coots (Lyon 2003), orangutans (Call 2000; Shumaker
et al. 2001), lions (McComb et al. 1994), lemurs (Lewis et al.
2005; Santos et al. 2005), and dolphins (Kilian et al. 2003;
Mitchell et al. 1985) have some number concept; domestic
dogs are sensitive to mass if not number (West and Young
2002), and even salamanders may represent more versus less
(Uller et al. 2003).
1
Nevertheless, the extent to which animals
understand number when compared to young children (e.g.
Mix et al.2002) is still unclear, and as noted above,several re-
searchers consider more advanced numerical abilities–exact
counting of quantities ≥4 and arithmetic operations–to be
uniquely human and based on language skills (Spelke and
Tsivkin 2001).
Apes referentially trained with Arabic numerals (chim-
panzees, Pan troglodytes; Biro and Matsuzawa 2001;Boysen
and Berntson 1989, 1990; Kawai and Matsuzawa 2000;Mat-
suzawa 1985; Murofushi 1997), or a Grey parrot (Psittacus
erithacus) referentially using vocal English number words
(Pepperberg 1987, 1994, 2006a, b; Pepperberg and Gordon
2005) would seem to be intermediary links between animals
lacking such training and children (note Watanabe and Huber
2006); some of these animals have indeed demonstrated ad-
vanced numerical skills (e.g. addition and ordinality). Here
I review the parrot work to show similarities and differences
between human children and a nonhuman, nonprimate, non-
mammalian species trained to use certain English labels ref-
erentially. I describe the parrot’s data, briefly discuss possible
mechanisms he might use, and in the process compare his
numerical abilities to those of children.
Basic numerical abilities
After several years of training with a modeling technique, the
Model-Rival (M/R) procedure (Pepperberg 1981), a Grey
parrot, Alex, used vocal English labels to identify various
objects, materials, colors, and shapes (review in Pepperberg
1999). He understood concepts of categories–that an item
could be classified with respect to its color, shape, material,
or label. He had functional use of phrases such as “I want
X” and “Wanna go Y”, X and Y being appropriate object
or location labels. He understood concepts of “same” and
“different”: for any object pair he could label the attribute
that was the same or different, and state “none” if nothing
was same or different (Pepperberg 1999). But could he form
an entirely new categorical class consisting of labels for
quantity?
Could he be trained, for example, to reclassify items he
currently labeled “key” or “green key” as “five key” (Pep-
perberg 1999)? To succeed, he would have to recognize that
a new set of labels, “one”, “two”, “three”, “four”, “five”,
and “six” represented a novel class: a means to categorize
items based on both physical similarity within a group and
a group’s quantity, rather than solely by physical character-
istics of group members. He would also have to generalize
1
Note that the estimation of larger versus smaller in the salamander
study might have arisen from the amount of movement rather than of
number.
Springer
Anim Cogn (2006) 9:377–391 379
this new class of number labels to sets of novel items, items
in random arrays, and heterogeneous collections. The study
would provide data on a parrot’s symbolic concept of number,
that is, his ability to vocally designate the exact quantity of
an array with an appropriate numerical, referential utterance.
Years before, Koehler (1943, 1950) and colleagues (Braun
1952;L
¨
ogler 1959) demonstrated Grey parrots’ sensitivity
to quantity–numerosity and numerousness. Koehler’s birds
learned, for example, to open boxes randomly containing 0,
1, or 2 baits until they obtained a fixed number (e.g. 4). The
number of boxes to be opened to obtain the precise num-
ber of baits varied across trials; the number being sought
depended upon independent visual cues: black box lids de-
noted two baits, green lids three, etc. Koehler claimed his
birds performed four different problems of this kind simul-
taneously. He did not state, however, if he presented differ-
ent colored lids randomly in a single series of trials, and
thus whether colors indeed “represented” particular quanti-
ties (see Pepperberg 1987, 1999). L
¨
ogler (1959) transferred
such behavior to flashes of light and notes of a flute, thus go-
ing from simultaneous visual representations to sequential
visual and auditory ones. But could Alex, like Matsuzawa’s
(1985) chimpanzee Ai, go beyond these tasks and use num-
ber as a symbolic, categorical label?
General training procedure
Alex was trained to identify small sets of objects with En-
glish number labels via the M/R procedure (see Pepperberg
1981, 1999), in which two humans demonstrate the targeted
vocal behavior. Students and I used a subset of all objects
available in the laboratory (e.g. keys and pieces of paper),
training him first on three and four,nexttwo and five, then six
and finally one. Details are in Pepperberg (1987). The reason
for the ordering was (a) he already identified triangles and
squares as “three-corner” and “four-corner” and (b) to avoid
cuing him on ordinality to see if this concept would emerge.
Individuals taught number labels in consecutive order might
use this information to learn that each successive label rep-
resents one more item than the one before it and form a
number line, thereby simplifying the acquisition of labels
for larger quantities. Such a procedure was avoided to en-
sure that Alex was building his concept of number solely by
forming one-to-one associations between specific quantities
and their respective number labels. Training also eschewed
use of plurals so that Alex had to use “How many X?” rather
than a final “s” to distinguish a number question from one
involving color or shape (e.g., “What color X?”). Ordinal-
ity has indeed emerged (Pepperberg 2006b), and training on
seven and eight are currently under way.
As described in Pepperberg (1987, 1999), Alex’s speed of
acquisition of any label (color, shape, number, etc.) was more
often constrained by his need to learn how to control the many
different parts of his vocal tract to produce a vocal English
response (Patterson and Pepperberg 1994, 1998) rather than
by the difficulty of the cognitive task. Thus I do not report
number of trials to acquisition. Labels that contain familiar
sounds may be learned in a single session; labels that contain
sounds difficult to produce in an organism lacking lips (e.g.
/p/, /wh/, /f/) can take weeks or even months to acquire. Note,
however, that preliminary data from experiments designed
to dissociate his ability to learn to produce vocal numerical
labels from his ability to comprehend the meaning of these
labels suggest that, much like children (Carey 2004), Alex
may master new number meanings either immediately or
within one or two trials (Pepperberg et al., unpublished data).
General testing procedure
All studies described here share a general testing procedure.
The procedure, including descriptions of precautions against
inadvertent and expectation cuing, is summarized below; de-
tails are in Pepperberg (1981, 1990, 1994). Specific queries,
of course, differed with the type of numerical task.
Test sessions, at most one per day, involving one numer-
ical question (i.e. on a single array) occurred two to five
times per week. Test questions were presented intermittently
either during free periods (when birds were requesting vari-
ous foods or interactions) or during sessions on current (and
thus unrelated) topics (e.g. using Alex to train another parrot
on color labels) until all questions for the experiments were
presented. As in all studies with Alex, the protocol differed
from the ones used with other animals in that the task capi-
talized on his ability to work in the vocal mode. A question
was repeated in a session only if his initial answer was in-
correct (Pepperberg 1981, 1987). Thus, the number of times
an array was presented depended on Alex’s accuracy. If he
produced the appropriate label, he received praise and the
items to which the question referred to or was allowed to
request an alternative reward. No further presentations of the
same array then occurred; that is, there was one, “first trial”
response, and that was the only number question that day. If
an identification was incorrect or indistinct, the examiner re-
moved the array, turned his/her head, and emphatically said
“No!” Only under this condition was an array immediately,
repeatedly presented in order to penalize a “win-stay” strat-
egy, and presentation continued until a correct identification
was made or four attempts occurred; errors were recorded.
One number session could thus involve up to four trials on
the same question, but only if Alex erred. Questions were
randomly ordered by someone not involved in testing, and
different numbers were thus generally tested on successive
days. Only by chance could the same number be presented
successively. Note that each array was unique: Evenif similar
objects were used (e.g. pieces of paper), collections would
involve different colors, shapes, and/or textures.
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380 Anim Cogn (2006) 9:377–391
Test situations included specific precautions to avoid cu-
ing. One control was that each test session was, as noted
above, presented intermittently during free periods or work
on unrelated topics. A variety of objects were used in test-
ing, including ones used for training the other birds; thus
particular items would not cue Alex that a number test was
in progress. The same was true for the tray on which ob-
jects were placed: it was used for a variety of other ex-
periments (see Pepperberg 1999, 2006a for details). Alex’s
responses had to be chosen from his entire repertoire (>90
vocalizations, including labels for locations and foods) and
from among numerous possible topics concerning various
exemplars and questions during each session; each session
contained only a single number array. This design not only
increased task complexity, but prevented several forms of cu-
ing(seePremack1976, p. 132; Pepperberg 1999). A tester
who, for example, poses a series of similar questions may
expect a particular answer and unconsciously accept an in-
distinct (and by our criteria incorrect) response of, for ex-
ample, “gree” (a mix of “green” and “three”) for “three”.
Second, in general, a human other than the one presenting
the tray (one of three to five possible individuals in these
experiments), who did not know what was on the tray, con-
firmed the answer; his/her interpretation of Alex’s response
was thus unlikely to be influenced by an expectation of a
certain color or object label. Only after such confirmation
was Alex rewarded (Pepperberg 1981). Third, Alex could
not have picked up on trainer-induced cues specific to a
given label (Pepperberg 1981) because students who did not
train number labels did the testing; also, for the majority of
studies described here, no overlap occurred between training
and testing situations–training on color, object, and number
labels had occurred years before and involved 90 utterances.
Fourth, because several different humans (at least three, of-
ten as many as five) were involved in testing, the presence of
a particular individual could not cue a number session. Fifth,
the evaluator was unlikely to be influenced by hearing the
type of question posed: In a previous study, transcriptions of
contextless tapes of Alex’s responses in a session agreed with
original evaluations to within 98.2%
2
(Pepperberg 1992).
Binomial tests were most often used to evaluate Alex’s
results for statistical significance, basing chance on number
of labels relevant to a task; chance can vary from 1/2 to
1/7, depending on the query. Calculations are conservative
in that they assume 100% comprehension of a query and,
when appropriate, labels identifying a subset (i.e. that he un-
2
This percentage represented 106 matches of 108 vocalizations. As an
additional control, the principal investigator made two transcriptions of
a student, new to the lab, as he responded to the same type of questions
as Alex. The first transcription was live; the second, made several days
later, was of a tape from which all questions had been edited. The two
transcriptions of the student’s vocalizations matched to within 95.8%
(68 of 71 vocalizations).
derstands labels such as “color” [and specific color labels],
“matter” [and specific material labels], etc. in queries such
as “How many green wood?” or “What color is five?”). Less
conservative calculations would include the probability of
erring on nonnumber labels; for example, correctly compre-
hending the number but incorrectly labeling or targeting the
relevant color or object. Because he was ∼80% correct on
color–shape–material–object comprehension tasks (Pepper-
berg 1990, 1992), probability for such a misidentification
was small but not nonexistent.
3
Chance could also be based
on production of all possible color or object labels, as if
he randomly guessed after limiting his choice to colors,
materials, or objects after hearing “What color ...”(on
queries such as “What color [is the set of] three?”). Note that
anything in his large repertoire is a possible response; all cal-
culations assume he will always (p =1) attend and respond
correctly to the numerically relevant part of the question (i.e.
not provide a random label with no connection to the task at
hand, e.g. a shape label). In all cases the most conservative
value of chance was used (see Pepperberg 1999 for details).
Results
The data showed Alex had some concept of quantity, but not
necessarily one matching that of a human child (Fuson 1988;
Mix et al. 2002; Pepperberg 1999). He could label sets of
≤6 different physical items (78.9%, all trials; Pepperberg
1987; Table 1); items did not need to be familiar nor in any
particular pattern, such as a square or a triangle. Moreover, if
presented with a heterogeneous set–of X’s and Y’s–he could
respond appropriately to “How many X?”, “How many Y?”,
or “How many toy?” (70.0%, first trials; Pepperberg 1987).
His level was beyond some children, who generally see only
homogeneous sets (e.g. Starkey and Cooper 1995) and who,
if asked about subsets in a heterogeneous set, usually label
the total number of items if, like Alex, they have been taught
to label homogeneous sets exclusively (see Siegel 1982;
Greeno et al. 1984). By involving a variety of exemplars,
tests ruled out Alex’s use of cues such as mass, brightness,
surface area, odor, object familiarity, or canonical pattern
recognition (Pepperberg 1987, 1999). I had not, however,
ruled out use of a noncounting strategy such as subitizing
for the smallest collections or “clumping” or “chunking”–a
form of subitizing (e.g. perception of six as two groups
of three; see Jevons 1871; Mandler and Shebo 1982;von
Glasersfeld 1982)–to correctly quantify larger collections.
Other tests were needed to rule out these possibilities.
3
If we indeed factored this possibility of error into our calculations, I
would have to use much higher chance values for all the experiments.
As noted, I always used the more conservative value of chance.
Springer
Anim Cogn (2006) 9:377–391 381
Table 1 Alex’s use of number labels to categorize arrays of objects
Object Quantity Score Error (no. of times)
Paper 2 9/10 Paper (1)
3 9/11 Paper (2)
4 9/11 U paper (1), paper (1)
5 7/11 Paper (2), 4 paper (1), U paper (1)
63/3
Key 2 10/13 Key (3)
3 9/14 U key (1), key (3), 4 key (1)
49/11Key(2)
56/7Key(1)
63/4Key(1)
Wood 2 11/12 Wood (1)
3 7/11 Peg wood (1), 3 peg wood (1), wood (1)
4 9/11 U wood (1), 3 wood (1)
5 7/10 3 wood (1), 4 hide (1), 4 wood (1)
6 3/4 Peg wood (1)
Peg wood 2 9/10 Peg wood (1)
3 8/9 4 wood (1)
4 9/12 Peg wood (2), 3 wood (1)
5 6/8 4 peg wood (2)
6 3/4 (6 wood, peg wood) as one phrase
Cork 2 11/16 Cork (5)
3 9/10 Cork (1)
4 10/12 3 cork (1), 4 wood (1)
55/5
6 2/3 Cork(1)
“U” represents an unrecognizable vocalization. Because six was the
very last label to be taught up to this point (in 1986), fewer test results
were available for this number; nevertheless, Alex’s ability to quantify
six items overall is 11/14, or 78.6%. Note that many errors are of
omission of the number label (from Pepperberg 1987).
Confounded number sets
An inferential test to distinguish perceptual recognition
(subitizing) from counting in humans is based on visual pro-
cessing mechanisms and involves “distractors” (Trick and
Pylyshyn 1989, 1994): Subjects enumerate items in two dif-
ferent fields of distractors: (1) white or vertical lines among
green horizontals; (2) white vertical lines among green verti-
cal and white horizontals. Subitizing occurs for 1–3 only for
the first condition. Subitizing thus seems to fail when con-
junctive attentive processing is required for enumeration—
when subjects must distinguish among various items defined
by a collection of features (e.g. color and shape; see
Pepperberg 1999). Such findings are consistent with the
suggestion that the number of items that can be apprehended
simultaneously decreases as the amount to be perceived
about them increases (Glanville and Dallenbach 1929).
Similar tests could be given to Alex because he already used
a conjunctive condition to identify a single object within
a collection (e.g. a red key within a collection of colored
keys and other red items; Pepperberg 1992). He could now
be asked to label the quantity of a similarly defined subset.
Table 2 Results and errors on heterogeneous “confounded” number
task, listed for the targeted quantity
Quantity Score Probability Wrong label Error type
a
1/4 1/3
1 7/9 0.0012 0.0073 2, 3 C, O
2 8/9 0.0001 0.0009 4 R
3 6/9 0.0087 0.0341 2, 2, 4 O, O, O
49/9<0.0001 0.0001
5 7/9 0.0012 0.0073 2, 3 C–O,O
6 8/9 0.0001 0.0009 4 C
All probabilities are based on chance values of 1/4 and 1/3; all proba-
bilities can be multiplied by a factor to take into account the probability
that Alex was able to identify the targeted subset correctly (from Pep-
perberg 1994).
a
Error types were as follows: C: color (Alex’s response was consis-
tent with the number of items in the subset that corresponded to the
targeted objects but not the targeted color); O: object (Alex’s response
was consistent with the number of items in the subset that corresponded
to the targeted color but not the targeted object); C–O: color and object
(Alex’s response consistent with the number of items in a subset that
did not correspond to either the targeted color or object); R: Alex’s
answer was random, that is, did not correspond to the number of items
of any presented subset.
Success would demonstrate whether Alex’s competency,
if not necessarily his strategy, was equivalent to that of
humans (Pepperberg 1994).
Task and results
Alex was thus shown “confounded number sets” (quantities
of four sets of items varying in two colors and two object
categories–e.g. blue and red wood and blue and red wool)
and was asked to enumerate items uniquely defined by both
one color and one object category (e.g. “How many blue
wood?”). His accuracy of 45/54, 83.3% (Pepperberg 1994)
replicated that of humans in a comparable study (Trick and
Pylyshyn 1989). Of additional importance was whether
his scores varied according to number (Table 2) because
a subitizing mechanism would be implied by data that (a)
demonstrate a break in accuracy between, for example,
3 and 4 and (b) for larger numerosities, conform at least
qualitatively to Weber’s law (Gallistel and Gelman 1992;
roughly stated, the greater the reference numerosity, the
more imprecisely will a subject distinguish between it
and nearby numerosities). That is, if the subject has high
accuracy for small numbers but lower accuracy for larger
ones, the subject is likely subitizing the smaller ones and
using some other noncounting procedure for the larger ones.
Thus, if Alex used a perceptual strategy similar to that used
by humans, rather than some form of counting, he would
make no errors for 1 and 2, few for 3, and more errors
for larger numbers (Mandler and Shebo 1982). Sequential
canonical analysis (Gorsuch and Figueredo 1991), however,
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382 Anim Cogn (2006) 9:377–391
showed that errors varied randomly with respect to number
of items to be identified (Pepperberg 1994).
Discussion of errors
A detailed examination of Alex’s responses revealed that
some errors might involve misunderstanding questions, not
numerical incompetence (Pepperberg 1994, 1999). Errors
could, in fact, arise from four sources unrelated to number
(Pepperberg 1992): (1) confusion of labels that sound alike;
(2) misunderstanding the label directing a search; (3) prob-
lems with perceptual boundaries, e.g. differences in avian
and human color perception; or (4) failure to understand that
information from two categories must be used to identify
targeted items (conjunction of information). Interestingly,
only one error was random (i.e. did not correspond to any
presented quantity). In a previous label comprehension study
(Pepperberg 1992), almost half Alex’s errors involved labels
that, at least to humans, sound similar (e.g. rock and block).
Such confounds were mostly eliminated in the present task,
but a few trials combined block and truck. Such labels match
only in the final consonant cluster, but Alex twice gave the
number of trucks, rather than blocks, in a relevant trial. On
one such trial, however, he also erred with respect to color
(Pepperberg 1994). Determining if Alex misunderstood
one or both labels directing the search is difficult because
such errors cannot be distinguished from numerical errors
(Pepperberg 1994, 1999). Previously, however, he scored
∼80% on tests requiring comprehension of attribute labels
(Pepperberg 1990, 1992) and scores on the present task
were comparable. Of course, he may have misinterpreted
the defining labels, then correctly quantified the incorrectly
targeted subset. Indeed, eight of his nine errors were the
correct number for an alternative subset (Pepperberg 1994).
Perceptual errors were also possible. Few of Alex’s nine
errors, however, could be attributed to perceptual confounds
(Pepperberg 1994). Tests avoided collections combining
items such as rocks (Playdoh) and rawhide–difficult even
for humans to distinguish by sight. A separate perceptual
issue is that parrots and humans have different visual color
boundaries (Bowmaker et al. 1994, 1996); thus Alex may
confuse orange with red or yellow; purple with blue or red.
Such combinations were avoided as much as possible. In two
trials in which he responded with the number of the wrong
colored subset, he labeled the number of green, not yellow,
wools and yellow, not purple, papers.
In all cases, Alex used the conjunctive condition (Pep-
perberg 1994). He never quantified a subset defined by
only one attribute (e.g. tallied all trucks). In eight out of
nine errors, he labeled the quantity of a nontargeted subset
that was still defined by a conjunction of color and object
labels.
Discussion of mechanisms
Alex’s mechanisms may not be identical to those of humans
(Pepperberg 1994, 1999). He might subitize all quantities
if avian visual perceptual capacities are superior to–or dif-
ferent from–those of humans. For example, unlike humans,
might he perceptually segregate a set to be enumerated, then
subitize (Dehaene and Changeux 1993)? Because targeted
items are scattered among >9 distractors, such a strategy is
unlikely for humans but may be possible for birds. Note that
avian numerical perception may surpass that of humans in
the auditory, sequential mode (Thompson 1968
;Wolfgramm
and Todt 1982); that is, because numbers of notes repeated
in songs or calls may indicate different danger or aggression
levels (e.g. Templeton et al. 2005), birds may be particularly
good at distinguishing among various numbers of rapidly
presented auditory stimuli, and conceivably transfer such
ability not only between auditory and visual modes but also
between sequential and simultaneous processes (Seibt 1982).
To ensure Alex was beyond subitizing range, he would have
to be tested on visual simultaneous quantities larger than
those sequentially perceived auditorially in nature, but no
data exist on how Greys process natural vocalizations. So,
though results suggested that a bird had a competence level
that, in an ape, would be considered comparable to a human
with respect to quantifying sets of items (Pepperberg 1999),
more was needed to determine the extent of Alex’s abilities.
Comprehension of number labels
Although Alex achieved high scores on labeling numer-
ical sets, such data did not show if he had formed only
one-directional associations (i.e. could produce but not com-
prehend labels, which was a problem in some early studies
on apes’ communicative and cognitive abilities and can oc-
cur in some instances in children as well; Savage-Rumbaugh
et al. 1980, 1993; Fuson 1988), or if he fully understood the
interchangeability of numerical questions (comprehension
as well as production). For example, children who succeed
on “How many marbles?”, showing that they can produce an
appropriate number label, may fail on “Give me X marbles”;
thus demonstrating that they really do not understand the
relationship between the number label and quantity (see com-
plete discussion in Wynn 1990). Note that this situation is the
exact opposite from the usual comprehension–production
distinction, in which children often provide evidence that
they comprehend a label (e.g. via a looking task) before they
can produce it (Golinkoff et al. 1987). If labeling indeed
separates animal and human numerical abilities (see above
discussion; Watanabe and Huber 2006), such equivalence
is crucial to demonstrate nonhuman numerical competence
(Fuson 1988). Even data demonstrating comprehension
Springer
Anim Cogn (2006) 9:377–391 383
Fig. 1 Alex doing the number comprehension trials
would not conclusively determine whether Alex was
counting, but would provide additional evidence of his
understanding of numerical symbols (Pepperberg and
Gordon 2005).
Procedure (after Pepperberg and Gordon 2005)
Alex was shown collections with either three different nu-
merical sets of the same objects of different colors (e.g. two
orange blocks, three blue blocks, and six green blocks; see
Fig. 1) or three different numerical sets of different objects
of the same color (e.g. one red block, four red keys, five red
sticks) all intermixed. He was asked “What color (object)
[is] number X?”, where X =1–6. He received no training
prior to testing (Pepperberg and Gordon 2005). Given the
arrangement of items on the tray, the closeness of the tray to
Alex’s eye (5–10 cm), and the distance of the tray from the
questioner’s face (20–25 cm), Alex could not be cued as to
the relevant subset by following eye gaze of the experimenter
(e.g. Peignot and Anderson 1999; Vick and Anderson 2003).
The procedure required that he comprehend the auditori-
ally presented numeral label (e.g. “6”) and use its meaning
to direct a search for the cardinal amount specified by that
label (e.g. six things), that is, know exactly what a set of “X”
individual items is, even when intermixed with other items
representing different numerical sets. Items for each number
were not clumped together, and each item of a particular set
was generally closer to an object of another set than to one
of its own. Alex could not perform the task without com-
prehending the number label. Each query also retested his
ability to identify the object or color of the set specified by
the numerical label. To respond correctly, he had to process
all types of information errorlessly. Some or all this behav-
ior likely occurred as separate steps, each adding to task
complexity (Premack 1983).
Results
Alex’s score was 58/66, or 87.9% (first trials, binomial test,
p<0.001, chance 1/3; Table 3). He made no errors on the
first 10 trials, two errors in the second 10 trials, one in each
10 of the subsequent 20 trials, two in the next 10 trials,
and two in the last 6 trials (Pepperberg and Gordon 2005).
His error pattern suggested lack of focus or inattention as
testing proceeded, not learning from mistakes. Number label
comprehension matched production; that is, he understood
what his number labels represent. He thus surpassed children
up to about 3 years old, who, for example, may point to each
item in a set, state “1, 2, 3”, but not understand that three
items actually are present (Fuson 1988). How he compares to
somewhat older children ( ≥3.5 years), who have generally
begun to understand number labels fully and to count in the
traditional sense (Fuson 1988; Wynn 1990), is unclear. He
seems to have little difficulty with numbers differing by small
amounts. Five of eight errors appear in such trials, but some
may be due to color perception or phonological confusion.
He often erred in distinguishing orange from red or yellow,
which, as noted above, is a consequence of differences in
parrot and human color vision (Bowmaker et al. 1994, 1996).
He also sometimes confused “wool” and “wood” and “truck”
and “chalk”, the latter being pronounced a bit like “chuck”.
Given that Alex was not trained on the comprehension task,
his results are compelling.
Use of “none”
Of particular interest, however, was the 10th trial within the
first dozen. Alex was asked “What color 3?” to a set of
two, three, and six objects. He replied “five”; the questioner
asked twice more, each time he replied “five”. The ques-
tioner, not attending to the tray, finally said “OK, Alex, tell
me, what color 5?” Alex immediately responded “none”. He
had learned to state “none” if no category (color, shape, or
material) was same or different when queried about similar-
ity or difference for two objects (Pepperberg 1988), and had
spontaneously transferred this response to “What color big-
ger?” for two objects of identical size in a study of relative
size (Pepperberg and Brezinsky 1991), but had never been
taught the concept of absence of quantity nor to respond to
absence of an exemplar.
4
Note that he not only provided the
correct response, but also set up the question himself. The
4
On one trial during a comprehension study, Alex was asked “What
object is purple?” when no purple object was present in an attempt to
determine if he would use “none”; he requested a grape (Pepperberg
1990). Although the likelihood of his requesting that particular item
was small (1/11 even if we restrict chance to foods he could label at the
time rather than his entire repertoire), the request could simply have
been one of his frequent requests for treats during sessions. We did not
pursue this line of inquiry further.
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384 Anim Cogn (2006) 9:377–391
Table 3 Results and errors for
Alex’s comprehension trials for
the targeted number (binomial
test, chance 1/3, except for
“none”, where chance was 1/4)
a
(from Pepperberg and Gordon
2005)
No. Score Percentage Probability Trial type Error descriptions
18/1080 <0.005 1O-2Ppl-5G paper rings Stated Y not O
1Ppl-4Y-6O jelly beans Stated Y not Ppl
29/1090 <0.001 2B-5O-6Gy jelly beans Stated O not B
3 10/10 100 <0.001
48/1080 <0.005 3Ppl-4O-6R rods Stated R not O
1Y-3R-4Ppl rods Stated B not Ppl
58/1080 <0.005 2key-4spool-5wood Stated wool not wood
2truck, 5chalk, 6pegwood Stated truck not chalk
6 10/10 100 <0.001
None 5/6 83.3 <0.005 2Ppl-4G-5Y cups
b
, what color 1? Stated O, no O present
a
B is blue, G is green, Gyisgreyish-black, O is orange, Ppl is purple, Risred(Alex’s label is “rose”; Pepperberg
1981), Y is yellow. “Pegwood” is Alex’s label for a clothes pin. Wood refers to popsicle sticks of 2–3 inch
lengths; wooden rods were 2–4 inch long and 1/8 inch diameter; jelly beans were both standard and miniature
sized.
b
Cups were of different sizes: two large, four medium, and five small.
query was repeated randomly throughout other trials with re-
spect to absence of each possible number to ensure that this
situation was not an odd happenstance. On these “none” tri-
als, Alex’s accuracy was 5/6 (83.3%; binomial test, p<0.01,
chance of ... [three relevant color labels plus “none”]). His
one error was to label a color not on the tray.
The conventional term, “zero”, had not been introduced
to indicate absence of quantity; Alex’s use of “none” for this
purpose was unexpected and impressive for at least four rea-
sons (Pepperberg and Gordon 2005). First, labeling a null
set, whether by “zero” or “none”, is a fairly recent human
development (Bialystok and Codd 2000). That Alex, with
a walnut-sized brain whose ancestral evolutionary history
with humans likely dates from the dinosaurs, represented
zero, even if not in a manner identical to that of humans,
is striking. Second, the notion of none is abstract and relies
on violation of expectation of presence (Pepperberg 1988);
even though Alex already associated “none” with absence
of similarity and difference (Pepperberg 1988) and lack of
size difference (Pepperberg and Brezinsky 1991), he trans-
ferred the notion across domains to quantity, without train-
ing or prompting. Third, if parrots represent quantity as do
children, then his comprehension of zero/none should have
lagged behind than that of other small numbers (Wellman and
Miller 1986). Children may have a none/nothing concept be-
fore learning that this quantity has a special label, “zero”
(Wellman and Miller 1986); Alex was not taught “zero” but
deliberately used “none” in a number comprehension task.
5
Finally, and likely most importantly, he initiated the topic.
He repeatedly stated “five” when asked about “three”; when
asked about the nonexistent “five”, he responded appropri-
ately. The cognitive processes leading to this behavior are
5
Alex’s “none” is unlikely to be related to a child’s “allgone”: He did
not use the term after eating all the jelly beans or after tossing all the
blocks to the floor, which is the common response of children.
unknown. Possibly his action, occurring soon after a pe-
riod of task noncompliance (Pepperberg and Gordon 2005),
resulted from lack of interest and an attempt to make the
procedure more challenging: Alex, when noncompliant, oc-
casionally stated, then repeated, all colors not present on
the trial; such behavior may have been a precursor to us-
ing “none”. Alex may not have understood none or zero in
an ordinal sense; young children and apes have some diffi-
culty with ordinal use of zero (Biro and Matsuzawa 2001;
Wellman and Miller 1986), and relating cardinal and ordinal
meaning is a hallmark of abstract numerical sense (Gelman
and Gallistel 1986).
As usual, Alex’s abilities raised more questions than they
did answers. How closely did his notion of “none” match
children’s and animals’ understanding of zero? Might his
understanding of number match that of chimpanzees who
add and subtract (Boysen and Berntson 1989)?
Addition and further study of “none”
Few studies examine true addition in animals. True addition
requires a subject to observe two (or more) separate quanti-
ties and provide the exact label for their total (Dehaene 1997).
Only one study, on an ape, involved summation and required
symbolical labeling of the sum (Boysen and Berntson 1989),
demonstrating that the ape knew exactly how many objects
were present at the end of the procedure; the study, however,
used quantity totaling only four. Other studies, involving
additive and subtractive tasks and using larger numbers of
objects (up to 10), used only one type of token and required
subject to choose the larger amount, not label final quan-
tity (e.g. Beran 2001, 2004; Rumbaugh et al. 1987, 1988).
6
6
Other studies have used smaller quantities (e.g. 0–4, which are within
what is generally accepted as the subitizing range), and will not be
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Anim Cogn (2006) 9:377–391 385
These procedural differences are important. First, when only
one token type (e.g. marshmallows) is used in studies of
relative amounts, evaluations of contour and mass, not num-
ber, could be responsible for the responses (Rousselle et al.
2004;seeMixetal.2002 for a review), as was the case
for pigeons (Columba livia; Olthof and Roberts 2000) and,
on occasion, children (Feigenson 2005). Second, when the
correct response is based on choice of relative amount, no
information is obtained on whether the subject has “...adig-
ital or discrete representation of numbers” (Dehaene 1997,
p. 27).
7
And not all arithmetical studies on animals involve zero
(Pepperberg 2006a). Zero is unique in that counting and
adding presuppose something to add or count; absence of
quantity may initially confuse children (see Bialystok and
Codd 2000). Also, apes’ understanding of zero is not fully
equivalent to that of humans. Although the ape Sheba was
tested using a placard “0” in her addition trials, and could
match one empty food tray to this placard, she never experi-
enced total absence of objects to add (Boysen and Berntson
1989). The apes Sherman and Austin had to choose the
greater quantity between two collections in which one food
well could be empty, but were not asked to label the re-
sults (Rumbaugh et al. 1987, 1988); Beran’s studies (2001,
2004) also did not involve labeling zero. Ai, trained both
to produce and comprehend “0” with respect to absence of
quantity, was not tested on zero in terms of arithmetic (Biro
and Matsuzawa 2001).
Despite the need to know more about Alex’s abilities,
additional experiments were unplanned (Pepperberg 2006a).
My students and I had begun a sequential auditory number
session (training to respond to, e.g. hearing three computer-
generated clicks with the vocal label “three”) with another
bird in the standard manner, saying “Listen”, clicking (this
time, twice), and then asking “Griffin, how many?” When
he refused to answer, we replicated the trial. Alex, who often
interrupts Griffin’s sessions with phrases like “Talk clearly”
or who occasionally answers even though he is not part of
the procedure, said “four”. Alex was told to be quiet, as the
discussed because tasks involving these small quantities can be solved
by perceptual mechanisms (see discussion in Beran 2004). Experiments
with Alex specifically involved quantities >4 so as to test his capacities
beyond the subitizing range.
7
An example might help here: Let us assume that a bird can sing a
song and can make a one-to-one correspondence between the notes in
the song and various objects as they are placed in each pile ... and it
gets a reward for choosing the pile with more “stuff”. So it might, for
a given trial, sing “The itsy bitsy spider went up the water spout, down
...” for one pile and ...“The itsy bitsy spider went up the water spout,
down came ...” for the other, and choose the pile associated with the
longer song; in an “addition” study, it then adds one or two notes to the
appropriate song depending on what is added to which set ... but has
not a clue as to how many things are in each pile, merely still a sense
of more versus less.
answer for the specific trial was “two”. The trial was repli-
cated yet again with Griffin, who remained silent; Alex now
said “six”, which implied that he had summed all the clicks.
A decision was thus made to replicate, as close as possible,
the addition study of Boysen and Berntson (1989) and to
extend the study to further work on zero (Pepperberg 2006a).
Procedure (from Pepperberg 2006a)
Without prior training, addition trials began when a human,
out of Alex’s sight, placed items, counterbalancing number
sets right and left across trials, on a tray and covered the
items with plastic cups. Items such as randomly shaped
pieces of nuts or different sized jelly beans were used to
avoid mass-contour issues (Mix et al. 2002). On a few
trials, identical candy hearts were used to see if allowing
responses with respect to mass-contour affected accuracy
(see Feigenson 2005).
Each total amount was presented eight times, in random
order, such that no collection was shown sequentially; col-
lections totaled to every amount from 1 to 6. Alex was also
asked “Howmanybean/nut/heart?” eight times when nothing
was under any of the cups. Addends were displayed an equal
number of times, such that, for example, amounts adding to
6 were presented as 6 +0, 5 +1, 4 +2, and 3 +3, two times
each, alternating quantities under right/left cups; amounts
adding to 5 were displayed as 5 +0, 4 +1, 3 +2, etc.; ex-
aminers could present 1 only as 1 +0, randomizing quantity
under right/left cups. (NB: Unless otherwise stated, X +Y
collections refer to X +Y and Y +X forms.) All possible ad-
dend collections were also randomized. When multiple ob-
jects were under a single cup, each object was less than 1cm
from other nearest items and generally the distance was less.
Trials proceeded as follows. The human brought the tray
to Alex’s face, lifted the cup on his left, showed him what
was under the cup for 2–3 s in initial trials, and then replaced
the cup over the quantity; the procedure was replicated for
the cup on his right. In trials comprising the last third of the
experiment, he had ∼10–15 s to view the items under each
cup, including (for reasons that become apparent below) a
replication of all 5 +0 trials that had been given for 2–3 s.
The experimenter made eye contact with Alex, who was then
asked, vocally, and without anytraining, to respond to queries
such as “How many nut total?” No objects were visible
during questioning. To respond correctly, he had to remember
the quantity under each cup, perform some combinatorial
process, then produce a label for the total amount. He had
no time limit in which to respond, but if he did not answer
within about 5 s, the question was restated; if he grabbed and
overturned a cup, items were covered, he was again shown
both sets of objects sequentially, and the query was restated.
Given that his time to respond generally correlated with his
current interest in the items being used in the task, rather
Springer
386 Anim Cogn (2006) 9:377–391
Table 4 Results and errors for
Alex’s addition trials, with
respect to the total number of
objects presented (from
Pepperberg 2006a)
Sum Score Percentage Probability
a
Trial type error Error descriptions
1 8/8 100 <0.005 NA
2 7/8 87.5 <0.005 1 +15
3 8/8 100 <0.005 NA
4 7/8 87.5 <0.005 3 +1 3 (seemed to label addend)
5 4/8 50 0.25 3 +2 (2x)
b
2, 3; 3 (seemed to label addends)
5 +0 (2x)
c
6 (4x); 6 (4x)
6 7/8 87.5 <0.005 3 +3 3 (seemed to label addend)
a
Binomial test, calculated on the basis of 1/3, the stricter criteria.
b
Note that if only these errors were counted, and the correct responses for 5 +0 trials repeated under longer
time trials substituted for the errors made during the 2–3 s trials, Alex’s score would have been 6/8, or 75%,
and the p value for his score would have been 0.02.
c
Under 2–3 s time limit; when trials were repeated with longer times, Alex was correct.
than the task itself (Pepperberg 1988), response latency was
not recorded. In the trials for which nothing was under both
cups, the goal was to determine the extent to which he could
generalize use of “none” without instruction.
Results and discussion
Alex’s scores were calculated several ways and examined for
several issues (Table 4; details of each trial are in Pepperberg
2006a). One issue of interest was that for X +0 trials, he had
difficulty only with X =5. He could not do 5 +0trialsin
2–3 s; he consistently said “six”, repeating the answer even
when told he was wrong. Retaining the errors for the 5 +0
trials given in 2–3 s, Alex’s accuracy was 41/48 or 85.4% for
first trial responses (binomial test, p<0.005 chance 1/2 or
1/6), and 48/60 or 80% for all trials. If replications of 5 +0
trials under the 10–15 s time interval are substituted, his first
trial accuracy was 43/48 or 89.6%, p<0.005, and 48/53 or
90.6% for all trials. His accuracy for quantities summing to
1 or 2 was 15/16 or 93.8% (p<0.005); his accuracy for sets
summing to 5 or 6 when given the longer time period was
13/16 or 81.3% (p<0.005); the difference is nonsignificant
(comparing errors and correct scores for small versus large
trials, p =0.599, Fisher’s exact test); note that all errors for
larger sums involved apparent labeling of addends before la-
beling the total. Of particular interest was his first-trial score
for each sum; his accuracy was 5/6 or 84.3% (binomial test,
p<0.02 chance 1/3). Candy hearts did not help him with the
second 5 +0 trial or the single 3 +1 error. Though he did
not err on any of the other four trials using hearts, number of
errors overall was too small to suggest that using objects of
equal mass and contour made any difference. Interestingly,
three of his four errors on queries other than 5 +0involved
situations where the larger addend was on his left, that is, in
reverse of the ordinal number line; however, he was correct
on 18 of these reversed-order trials, suggesting that errors
were random (comparing errors and correct scores for re-
versed versus nonreversed trials, p =0.606, Fisher’s exact
test). Initially, when given only 2–3 s, he was always wrong
on the 5 +0 sum, consistently stating “6”. When given 10–
15 s, his accuracy went to 100% on 5 +0 trials; the difference
in accuracy between the shorter and longer interval trials was
significant (counting all queries for 0 +5 and 5 +0, Fisher’s
exact test, p =0.01). For other trials, he went from 26/29
(89.7%, p<0.005) for 2–3 s to 15/17 (88.2%, p<0.005) for
10–15 s, that is, remained constant.
Alex thus demonstrated some ability to sum small
quantities. Results seem independent of number or type of
objects involved, except for 5 +
0 trials given in 2–3 s that
he labeled as “6”, and some trials involving three where
he seemingly labeled addends before providing the sum.
If long-interval 5 +0 trials are used, he was as accurate on
small sums of one or two as on those summing to five or
six. His performance was apparently independent of mass
or contour; having equal mass-contour did not help when
time was restricted for 5 +0. Thus, in general, his data are
comparable to those of young children (Mix et al. 2002) and
apes (Boysen and Hallberg 2000). His responses on 5 +0
trials suggest he may be using a counting strategy for 5,
precisely because he needed additional time to achieve a
correct answer (see below, Pepperberg 2006a).
Alex did not respond “none” when nothing was under
any cup. On the first four trials, he looked at the tray and
said nothing. He sometimes tried to lift the cups; he was
then showed again, by a trainer who lifted cups one at
a time, that nothing was present. On the fifth, sixth, and
seventh trials, he said “one”. On the last trial, he again
refused to answer. These two responses to absence were
intriguing (Pepperberg 2006a). His failure to respond on
six trials suggests he recognized a difference from other
trials, that is, that standard number answers would be
incorrect. He did not, as he does when bored with a task
(e.g. Pepperberg 1992; Pepperberg and Gordon 2005), give
strings of wrong answers or request treats or to return to
his cage. He understood that the query (e.g., “How many
nut total?”) did not correspond to the number of cups;
Springer
Anim Cogn (2006) 9:377–391 387
he never said “two”. Overall, he acted more like autistic
children (Sherman, personal communication, January 17,
2005), who simply stare at the questioner when asked “How
many X?” if nothing exists to count. His response of “one”
on three trials (Pepperberg 2006a) suggests comparison to
Ai, who confused “one” with “zero”. Although Alex was
never trained on ordinality, and had learned numbers in
random order (see above), he, like Ai, seemed to grasp that
“none” and “one” represent the lower end of the number
spectrum. Data suggest that on tasks involving a number
line even humans may treat zero differently from other
numbers (Brysbaert 1995; Butterworth et al. 2001): more
time is needed to process zero than other numerals and its
processing may be based on different principles. As noted
earlier, Alex previously used “none” to denote absence of a
designated number of items (Pepperberg and Gordon 2005),
an attribute of the overall collection, which was a logical
extension of his use of “none” to mark absence of same–
different with respect to various attributes of object pairs,
including absence of size difference. Here he was asked to
denote the total absence of labeled objects, a different task.
Specifically, Alex’s use of “none” is zero-like, but is not
isomorphic with the adult human use of “zero”. He does
not use “none”, as he does his number labels (Pepperberg,
1987) to denote a specific numerosity (Pepperberg 2006a).
In that sense, he is like humans in earlier cultures,
8
or young
( ∼3-year-old) children, who seem to have to be about
4-year old before they achieve full adult-like understanding
of the labels for zero and other numerals (Bialystok and
Codd 2000; Wellman and Miller 1986). Thus, whether Alex
can acquire full understanding of the equivalence of “none”
to the concept of zero is still to be determined.
General discussion
In sum, Alex demonstrated a range of numerical concepts
that in many ways resemble those of young children in that
he referentially comprehends and produces number labels
with respect to specific exact quantities ( ≤6), can sum small
amounts (again ≤6) and has a zero-like concept; with re-
spect to the confounded number task, his abilities are similar
to those of adult humans. His capacities are not, however,
isomorphic with those of adult humans (e.g. he has not been
tested on subtraction, and he has only recently been exposed
to numbers greater than 6), and the extent to which his limi-
tations relate to the forms of training he received, his limited
language abilities, or both issues, remains unclear. Remem-
ber, unlike children, he did not learn number labels in order,
was not trained with a plural marker to denote quantity, and
8
Alexandrian Greeks, for example, used zero to denote the absence of
quantity, but it did not function for them as a number (Kline, 1972).
was not given explicit instruction on ordinality (e.g. to pro-
duce a vocal number line). I also have not yet discussed in
detail the mechanisms he might use in these tasks, or the
brain structures that might be involved.
Alex, like humans, likely uses different mechanisms for
different tasks and for smaller ( ≤4) and larger (>4) num-
bers. Alex’s tasks–to enumerate simultaneously presented
visual quantities—argues against use for ≤4 of an accumu-
lator, which, although often used to explain data from many
types of number-related tasks (Gallistel and Gelman 1992;
Meck and Church 1983), is more appropriate for tracking
sequences, such as tones or light flashes (see Benoit et al.
(2004) and particularly Mix et al. (2002) for detailed discus-
sions).
9
Alex’s data are not consistent with such a model,
10
as his errors do not increase with amount if time to respond
is not an issue. Similarly, although object file mechanisms
for ≤4 have also been used to explain various numerical
tasks (e.g. Uller et al. 1999), such a model is more useful for
detecting matches or mismatches between different arrays,
rather than direct enumeration (Benoit et al. 2004). Detailed
reviews of these mechanisms and Alex’s data can be found
in Pepperberg and Gordon (2005) and Pepperberg (2006a).
What is most likely for Alex is some form of comparison
of ≤4 arrays with representations of memorized canonical
sets (von Glasersfeld 1992). Unless birds have better per-
ceptual mechanisms than humans, Alex’s accuracy on sets
>4, and particularly his need for a longer time to quantify
5, also argues against use of a perceptual mechanism for this
quantity. For 5, he likely uses a mechanism more like human
counting.
11
When 6 was his largest known number label, it
may have come to represent anything ≥6. Note that, if given
larger quantities (7, 8, 9), Alex, before he had labels for these
arrays, also generally referred to them as “6” (Pepperberg,
unpublished data). I suggest he uses some form of canonical
comparison for quantities less than 5, switches to a counting-
style mechanism for 5 if given adequate time to process what
is presented, and before studies began on 7 and 8, probably
used a perceptual mechanism (“lots”) for ≥6.
9
Some researchers are truly wedded to the accumulator model and
others to object files, and considerable controversy exists as to which
should prevail. At some point, every researcher must weigh the data
on both sides and decide which are more convincing; I agree with Mix
et al.
10
A reviewer has suggested that Alex is using an accumulator that,
over the course of the many years that he has been exposed to numbers,
has been sharpened such that errors at discriminating neighboring nu-
merosities have been reduced. Such would, of course, also be true for
humans, and would be impossible to distinguish from counting for both
humans and animals. I leave it to the readers of this paper to evaluate
this possibility.
11
Note definition of counting in the Introduction; Alex does not vocally
tag items, which is why his behavior can only be considered “like”
human counting.
Springer
388 Anim Cogn (2006) 9:377–391
As has been argued previously, animals’ abilities to learn
in the laboratory are likely based on an existent cognitive ar-
chitecture (Pepperberg 1999, 2006a, b); their training merely
provides a way to examine the extent to which this architec-
ture matches that of educated humans (see Jarvis et al. 2005).
As noted above, some data suggest that specific human brain
areas are involved in numerical processing (e.g. Lemer et al.
2003; Dehaene et al. 2003); how might a parrot brain function
on tasks such as those given Alex? Does he havea homologue
or analogue of human inferior parietal cortices, particularly
the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and inferior parietal lobule, the
human areas supposedly tied to numerical competence (e.g.
Lemer et al. 2003)? Many number tasks involve issues of spa-
tial attention and nonsymbolic comparisons, which also cor-
relate to IPS activity (Coull and Nobre 1998; Fias et al. 2003;
G
¨
obel et al. 2004; Jordan et al. 2004;Simon1999)
12
and that
are essential for nonhuman survival; thus nonhumans likely
have analogous brain areas (note Walsh 2003). Studies also
suggest that different human brain areas are activated for pro-
cesses involving small versus large numbers (Colvin et al.
2005;G
¨
obel et al. 2001a, b); such might also be the case for
Alex. Clearly, his numerical abilities are not identical to those
of children, but his exposure to and training on such tasks
are also limited compared to that of an average preschooler.
Whatever brain areas he uses likely function in an analogous
manner at least to nonhuman primates, given the similari-
ties in data (Boysen 1993; Boysen and Berntson 1989, 1990;
Boysen and Hallberg 2000; Pepperberg 2006a, b).
Alex’s training on human number labels may have
enabled him, like Matsuzawa’s Ai (Matsuzawa 1985), Boy-
sen’s Sheba (Boysen 1993), and Premack’s and Boysen’s
Sarah (Boysen 1993), to use representational abilities that
would otherwise be inaccessible (see Watanabe and Huber
2006). These animals not only have access to symbols, but
also extensive enculturation to a variety of human cognitive
tasks; their data suggest that numerical concepts beyond
those involving very small quantities (i.e. ≤4) are functional
in at least some nonhumans (Pepperberg 2006a). Encultura-
tion issues are emphasized by data on the human Pirah
˜
a tribe,
who lack number labels and whose numerical abilities (they
seem to have “one”, “two”, and “many”; Gordon, 2004)
appear to be less complex than those of enculturated non-
humans. Thus, the ability to form symbolic representations,
whether for collections or concepts, appears to enhance
numerical competence, allowing a bird such as Alex and
various apes to perform at the level of young children who
are also beginning to understand symbolic representations.
12
Note that Coull and Nobre (1998) suggest that the left IPS is more
active in temporal attention and the right IPS in spatial attention, but
Fias et al. (2003) find more activity in the left IPS for representation of
symbolic and nonsymbolic magnitude. All cited studies do, however,
implicate the IPS in numerical tasks.
Additional studies are needed to determine the full extent of
Alex’s numerical capacities. He recently demonstrated some
understanding of ordinality (Pepperberg 2006b), but further
experiments are needed to determine if he can learn both
to produce and fully understand the meaning of an ordinal
number sequence, and use “none” as a numeral. He, like apes
and young children, must also be tested on subtraction (e.g.
Boysen and Berntson 1989, 1990; Fuson 1988), and whether
both addition and subtraction can be extended to symbolic
use of Arabic numbers. Although full-blown language, com-
pletely isomorphic with that of humans, may be necessary
for more advanced numerical concepts, such a level seems
not to be required for those concept so far understood by
Alex.
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Discussion

Tap the paper where you want to comment
The African gray parrot (Psittacus erithacus) is a species of parrot native to the rainforests of central Africa characterized by its distinctive gray plumage. The largest parrot in Africa is known for its remarkable intelligence. Gray parrots may live for 40-60 years in captivity. ![](https://i.imgur.com/rttRSop.jpg) **Subitizing** is the ability to reliably state the cardinality of a set without individually counting each item. In other words, subitizing is the capacity to instantly recognize "how many are there" in a small set. A good example of subitizing is looking at dice; when you roll a dice and you see three dots on top, you instantly recognize it as representing a quantity of three. You don’t need to count each dot individually to figure it out. **The Model/Rival method** is a training procedure that Dr. Pepperberg used to train parrots. The training included 2 people and Alex (the parrot), with one person being the ‘trainer’ and one being the ‘model’ as well as the ‘rival.’ The technique goes as follows: - Alex (the parrot) is accompanied by a human who acts just like another parrot in training - the idea is to create a peer for Alex. - The trainer (Bob), asks the human peer (Carl), a question about the number of items in a set (example of a question that might be asked to Alex) - Carl gives the right answer: e.g. "Two" - The trainer gives Carl a reward for getting it right e.g. gives him a toy that Alex the parrot might enjoy playing with - The same question is asked by the trainer to Alex. Alex follows his model/rival and gives the correct answer. Examples of distractors used by Trick and Pylyshyn to distinguish subitizing from counting (black vertical lines and white horizontal lines pictured in the right square) ![](https://i.imgur.com/UsyFlKF.png) For instance, the ancient Greeks had no symbol for zero, and did not use a digit placeholder for it. Alex provided the first evidence of animals other than primates showing some understanding of the concept of zero. [Here](https://www.nature.com/articles/srep10059) is a study of the representation of zero in the cortex of a monkey. There is evidence that nonhuman primates process a number of numerical abilities: - Ability to represent numerical values ([paper](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01719.x)) - General mechanism for mental comparison ([paper](https://www.pnas.org/content/102/45/16507.short)) - Impressive capacity to remember numbers and their ordinality ([video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsXP8qeFF6A)) - Capacity of using arithmetic algorithms for performing addition and subtraction ([paper](https://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.0050328)) There have been a number of recent studies relevant to this. In 2008 a [study](https://www.pnas.org/content/105/35/13179) was published that showed that Australian children who are monolingual speakers of two Australian languages with very restricted number vocabularies possess the same numerical concepts as a comparable group of English-speaking indigenous Australian children. In the cited paper looks at a patient with brain injuries that demonstrates a selective deficit in manipulating numbers. The patient was unimpaired in reading aloud letters, words and written number names but was unable to read aloud single arabic numerals. In addition, ability to produce the next number in the sequence and his ability to produce answers to simple addition and subtraction was relatively spared when the stimuli were presented as number names but impaired when the stimuli were presented as arabic numerals. Here is a [video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BG-0Bpe0J34) of Griffin, an African Grey parrot that was trained alongside Alex, demonstrating his abilities while being contrasted against children.