402 S. STIGLER
“If the question be thus stated, it appears
by an easy computation that the expectation
of A is greater than that of B or C; that is,
the task of A is the easiest. And the reason
is because A has all the chances of sixes
on his dyes for his expectation, but B and
C have not all the chances on theirs. For
when B throws a single six or C but one or
two sixes, they miss of their expectations.”
(Pepys, 1926, Vol. 1, 75–76; Schell, 1960)
Newton’s conclusion was of course correct but the
argument is not. It is easy for us to see that it cannot
work because the argument applies equally well for
weighted dice, and as we now know, the conclusion
fails if, for example, p is 1/4. Any correct argument
must explicitly use the fact that 1, 2, 3 are the expec-
tations for A, B, C, and Newton’s does not. His enu-
meration did do so, but A would equally well have “all
the chances of sixes on his dyes” even if the chance of
a“6”is1/4. Newton’s proof refers only to the sample
space and makes no use of the probabilities of different
outcomes other than that the dice are thrown indepen-
dently, and so it must fail. But Newton does casually
use the word “expectations”; might he not have had
something deeper in mind? His subsequent correspon-
dence confirms that he did not.
In his third letter of December 23, 1693, Newton re-
turned to this argument and expanded slightly on it.
He personified the choices by naming the player faced
with bet A “Peter” and the player faced with bet B
“James.” He then considered a “throw” to be six dice
tossed at once, so then Peter was to make (at least) one
“6” in a throw, while James was to make (at least) two
“6”s in two throws.
Newton then wrote, “As the wager is stated, Peter
must win as often as he throws a six [i.e., makes at
least one “6” among the six dice], but James may of-
ten throw a six and yet win nothing, because he can
never win upon one six alone. If Peter flings a six (for
instance) four times in eight throws, he must certainly
win four times, but James upon equal luck may throw
a six eight times in sixteen throws and yet win nothing.
For as the question in the wager is stated, he wins not
upon every single throw with a six as Peter doth, but
only upon every two throws wherein he throws at least
two sixes. And therefore if he flings but one six in the
two first throws, and one in the two next, and but one
in the two next, and so on to sixteen throws, he wins
nothing at all, though he throws a six twice as often as
Peter doth, and by consequence have equal luck with
Peter upon the dyes.” (Pepys, 1926, Vol. 1, page 89;
Schell, 1960)
Here we can see more clearly how Newton was led
astray: Even though in the first letter he had care-
fully pointed out that “throwing a six” must be read as
“throwing at least one six,” here he confused the two
statements. His argument might work if “exactly one
six” were understood, but then it would not correspond
to the problem as he and Pepys had agreed it should be
understood. Indeed, Peter will not necessarily register
againwithevery“6”:ifhehastwoormoreinthefirst
“throw” of six dice, he wins the same as with just one.
Newton reduced the problem to single “throws” where
each throw is a Binomial (N = 6,p = 1/6), and he lost
sight of the multiplicity of outcomes that could lead to
a win. Many of Peter’s wins (those with at least two
“6”s, which occurs in about 40% of the wins) would be
wins for James as well. And in some of James’s wins
(those with at least two “6”s in one-half of tosses and
none in the other half, about 28% of James’s wins) Pe-
ter would not have done so well on “equal luck” (he
would have won but half the time). Evidently to make
Newton’s argument correct would take as much work
as an enumeration!
5. CONCLUSION
Newton’s logical argument failed, but modern prob-
abilists should admire the spirit of the attempt. It was a
simple appeal to dominance, a claim that all sequences
of outcomes will favor Peter at least as often as they
will favor James. It had to fail because the truth of the
proposition depends upon the probability measure as-
signed to the sequences and the argument did not. But
this was 1693, when probability was in its infancy.
Why has apparently no one commented upon this
error before? There are several possible explanations,
and no doubt each held for at least one reader. (1) The
letters were read superficially, with no attempt to parse
the somewhat archaic language of the logical proof,
which after all points in the right direction. (2) The
language was puzzling and unclear to the reader (and
Newton was not available to ask), but it was accepted
since he was, after all, Isaac Newton, and the calcu-
lation clearly showed he was sound on the important
fundamentals. (3) The reader may even have seen that
it was not a satisfactory argument, but drew back from
accusing Newton of error, particularly since he got the
numbers right.
In a sense the argument is more interesting be-
cause it is wrong. Newton was thinking like a great