producing a product or selling it or financing it. But nothing about his selection makes him
an expert on inflation. Will his holding down the price of his product reduce inflationary
pressure? Or, by leaving more spending power in the hands of his customers, simply divert
it elsewhere? Or, by forcing him to produce less because of the lower price, will it simply
contribute to shortages? Even if he could answer these questions, how much cost is he
justified in imposing on his stockholders, customers and employees for this social purpose?
What is his appropriate share and what is the appropriate share of others?
And, whether he wants to or not, can he get away with spending his stockholders’,
customers’ or employees money? Will not the stockholders fire him? (Either the present
ones or those who take over when his actions in the name of social responsibility have
reduced the corporation’s profits and the price of its stock.) His customers and his
employees can desert him for other producers and employers less scrupulous in exercising
their social responsibilities.
This facet of “social responsibility” doctrine is brought into sharp relief when the doctrine
is used to justify wage restraint by trade unions. The conflict of interest is naked and clear
when union officials are asked to subordinate the interest of their members to some more
general purpose. If the union officials try to enforce wage restraint, the consequence is
likely to be wildcat strikes, rank-and-file revolts and the emergence of strong competitors
for their jobs. We thus have the ironic phenomenon that union leaders at least in the U.S.
have objected to Government interference with the market far more consistently and
courageously than have business leaders.
The difficulty of exercising “social responsibility” illustrates, of course, the great virtue of
private competitive enterprise it forces people to be responsible for their own actions and
makes it difficult for them to “exploit” other people for either selfish or unselfish purposes.
They can do good but only at their own expense.
Many a reader who has followed the argument this far may be tempted to remonstrate that
it is all well and good to speak of Government’s having the responsibility to impose taxes
and determine expenditures for such “social” purposes as controlling pollution or training
the hard-core unemployed, but that the problems are too urgent to wait on the slow course
of political processes, that the exercise of social responsibility by businessmen is a quicker
and surer way to solve pressing current problems.
Aside from the question of fact I share Adam Smith’s skepticism about the benefits that
can be expected from “those who affected to trade for the public good” this argument
must be rejected on the grounds of principle. What it amounts to is an assertion that those
who favor the taxes and expenditures in question have failed to persuade a majority of their
fellow citizens to be of like mind and that they are seeking to attain by undemocratic
procedures what they cannot attain by democratic procedures. In a free society, it is hard
for “evil” people to do “evil,” especially since one man’s good is another’s evil.
I HAVE, for simplicity, concentrated on the special case of the corporate executive, except
only for the brief digression on trade unions. But precisely the same argument applies to the
newer phenomenon of calling upon stockholders to require corporations to exercise social
responsibility (the recent G.M. crusade, for example). In most of these cases, what is in
effect involved is some stockholders trying to get other stockholders (or customers or
employes) to contribute against their will to “social” causes favored by the activists.
Insofar as they succeed, they are again imposing taxes and spending the proceeds.
The situation of the individual proprietor is somewhat different. If he acts to reduce the
returns of his enterprise in order to exercise his “social responsibility,” he is spending his
own money, not someone else’s. If he wishes to spend his money on such purposes, that
is his right, and I cannot see that there is any objection to his doing so. In the process, he,
too, may impose costs on employes and customers. However, because he is far less likely
than a large corporation or union to have monopolistic power, any such side effects will
tend to be minor.
Of course, in practice the doctrine of social responsibility is frequently a cloak for actions
that are justified on other grounds rather than a reason for those actions.
To illustrate, it may well be in the long-run interest of a corporation that is a major
employer in a small community to devote resources to providing amenities to that
community or to improving its government. That may make it easier to at tract desirable